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VACANT PROMISES?: THE ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION AND THE POST-DIVORCE FINANCIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF WOMEN
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

Certainly, the law of family dissolution needs reformation. Marriage dissolution all too frequently devastates women and their dependent children fi2
nancially, and financial deprivation precipitates a broad range of social prob3
lems and squanders societal resources. Many feminists argue for laws that
4
increase women’s access to financial resources at divorce. Others encourage reforms that level the playing field between divorcing husbands and wives, hop5
ing to improve the substance of negotiated separation agreements. With this
feminist agenda as a backdrop, this commentary evaluates the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution pertaining to spousal mainte6
nance (hereinafter Maintenance Principles) , property distribution (hereinafter
7
8
Property Principles) , child custody (hereinafter Custody Principles) , and sepa9
ration agreements (hereinafter Agreement Principles) and concludes that they

Copyright © 2001 by Penelope Eileen Bryan.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver.
1. Nearly all who study family dissolution or work within the field agree that systemic reform
must occur. But here agreement ends and controversy begins. Political factions offer dramatically
different goals for reform. Compare Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A
Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1193-94 & nn.187-90 (1999) [hereinafter Freedom]
with Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 713, 724-25,
733-42 & nn.107-69 (2000) [hereinafter Reasking] and Leslie Joan Harris, A “Just and Proper Division”:
Property Distribution at Divorce in Oregon, 78 OR. L. REV. 735, 737 (1999).
2. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1155 nn.14, 19 & 20, 1204 & nn.236-37; Reasking, supra note 1, at 713.
3. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1155-69; Reasking, supra note 1, at 755-61.
4. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1210 n.256; Reasking, supra note 1, at 754-55.
5. PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN, RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE IN DIVORCE: PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE REFORM (forthcoming 2002).
6. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch.
5 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997].
7. Id. at ch. 4.
8. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch.
2 (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part 1, 1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1998]; ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2000].
9. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, at ch. 7.
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do little to alleviate the post-divorce financial distress experienced by women
10
and their dependent children.
The ALI’s Maintenance and Property Principles do not explicitly attempt to
11
improve the post-divorce financial circumstances of women and children.
12
Rather they aspire to foster predictable results by restricting judicial discretion.
Limiting the discretion of judges who typically discriminate against women on
financial issues, could foster better results for divorcing women. The Maintenance Principles, for instance, provide standardized formulas for determining
13
spousal maintenance (compensatory payments) that might make these awards
14
both more likely and more adequate. The presumption the Property Principles
15
afford in favor of an equal distribution of marital assets may provide most
women with at least half of the marital property at dissolution. The gradual
16
conversion of separate property into marital property in long-term marriages
17
also offers women access to financial resources few states now provide.
Many mothers trade away their financial rights at divorce in order to
18
maintain custody of their children. The Custody Principles offer a presumption that allocates custodial responsibility for children in proportion to the care19
taking functions each parent previously performed for the child. Under this
standard, a caretaking mother would presumably have some assurance of re20
taining most of the custodial responsibility for the children, making her less
likely to trade-off important financial resources for the amount of custody she
desires.
On their surface, the above proposals seem to promise better financial results for women and children than the current system now generates. Moreover, the consistency and predictability they offer at trial should strengthen
21
women’s position in divorce negotiations. On closer inspection, however, I
suspect they will only marginally improve the post-divorce financial circumstances of only a few women and children. Section II explores the conceptual

10. In contrast, the Principles’ proposals regarding child support make several meaningful
changes in existing law. See generally ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8. For example, Section
3.16(2)(a) requires parents with the financial ability to support their children through college, graduate school, and professional training. Id. at 124.
11. In this article, I take the position, well-supported by social science data, that the financial
distress and decline of the residential parent necessarily and negatively affects the children. See
Freedom, supra note 1, at 1157-65.
12. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.02(3); ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, at 11, 13; see
also J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 801,
802 (1997).
13. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, §§ 5.05, 5.06, 5.12, 5.15, 5.16.
14. Presumably judges would follow the law. Predictable results at trial likely influence settlement outcomes as well.
15. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.15.
16. Id. § 4.18.
17. In all but very few states, a spouse’s separate property remains separate throughout the
marriage and at divorce. Id.
18. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1201.
19. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 2.09(1).
20. See infra notes 126-39 and accompany text for further assessment.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 11-20.
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and substantive problems found in the Maintenance Principles. Section III examines the Property Principles and finds conceptual and substantive problems
similar to those found in the Maintenance Principles. Section IV explains why
the Custody Principles fail to discourage women from compromising their financial interests in order to secure custody of their children. Section V explores
the reasons why the Agreement Principles’ deference to separation agreements
significantly undermines women’s financial interests at divorce.
II. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE AS COMPENSATORY PAYMENTS
Current law and its application contribute to the post-divorce financial de22
cline of women and children. In order to improve this situation, the law must
change radically and provide divorcing women greater access to income and
23
property. Yet the Maintenance Principles often justify specific provisions by
noting that they mimic current statutes or decisional patterns reflected in
24
caselaw. For instance, the Maintenance Principles change the justification for
25
spousal maintenance from “need” to “loss” and label payments “compensatory
26
awards” rather than “spousal maintenance.” They note that this reconceptualization leads to laws that reflect the award patterns commonly found in exist27
ing caselaw. This conservative approach of linking reform to existing spousal
maintenance patterns does not offer the more radical reforms necessary for real
improvement.
The focus on “loss” also fosters a narrow vision of entitlement. The Maintenance Principles acknowledge only the standard of living an individual loses
28
after a long-term marriage or the individual’s reduced earning capacity due to
29
caretaking responsibilities. The wife’s household labor that facilitated the hus30
band’s ideal worker status becomes conceptually peripheral, weakening the
justification for her entitlement to a share of his post-divorce income. A more
31
comprehensive justification would recognize that spouses (frequently wives)
32
33
34
who perform the bulk of marital labor suffer losses and make contributions
22. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1191-1239.
23. BRYAN, supra note 5.
24. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.03 cmt. c.; ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 9,
at 8.
25. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, at 8-9; ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 7, § 5.02.
26. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.03.
27. Id.
28. Id. §§ 5.03(2)(a), 5.05.
29. Id. §§ 5.03(2)(b), (c), 5.06, 5.12.
30. Williams describes how wives tend to sacrifice their own market participation in order to
facilitate the ideal worker status of their husbands. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New
Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2236-67 (1994). Williams also explains that even in two career
families, couples commonly engage in a game of “chicken” over who will provide housekeeping and
child care services. Due to her socialization that accords high priority to homemaking and child
care, the wife typically loses this game and performs most of these functions. Id. at 2240-41.
31. See, e.g., Scott Coltrane, Research on Household Labor: Modeling and Measuring the Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1208 (2000).
32. See id; Williams, supra note 30, at 2245-47 n.91.
33. Williams notes that wives who interrupt their careers lose an average of 1.5% of income for
each year they do not participate in market labor, with college-educated wives losing as much as
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that entitle them to a share of their husbands’ post-divorce income. The comments to the Maintenance Principles explicitly reject this contribution justifica35
They acknowledge that undoubtedly “some” cases support a factual
tion.
36
finding that the wife contributed to her husband’s earning capacity. But other
37
cases, they claim, do not support such a finding. They argue that if the Maintenance Principles adopted a contribution justification for all cases, awards in
38
many cases would lack a factual foundation.
The above rationale for rejecting a contribution justification is troubling for
three reasons. First, it ignores a substantial body of research indicating that
39
women today still perform at least twice as much routine housework as men,
with the average woman still performing about three times the amount of rou40
tine housework as the average man. Presumably in the typical, rather than the
rare household, the wife’s services provide the husband with more hours in his
day to devote to work or leisure, both of which may enhance his workforce per41
formance. Consequently I suspect most rather than some cases would provide a
factual foundation that supports a maintenance award based on a contribution
justification. Second, the Principles justify many of its proposals based on as42
sumptions the drafters make regarding human behavior and expectations.
Many of these assumptions lack empirical verification and likely will lack a
factual basis in many cases. I fail to understand the drafters’ reluctance to take a
less speculative leap of faith regarding the contribution justification for spousal
maintenance. Third, theoretical justifications for spousal maintenance prove especially critical, because the Maintenance Principles defer to the states to develop many of the specific rules that govern the availability and amount of
43
compensatory payments. Presumably a stronger justification than loss would

4.3%. Id. at 2257 n.148 (citing Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 395 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974)). See also
Elizabeth Smith Beninger & Jeanne Wielage Smith, Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support Determinations, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201, 207 (1982); Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investment in Human Capital: Earnings of Women, 82 J. POL. ECON. 576, 583 (1974). Estin reports a more recent study that found a typical wage gap of 33% the first year women returned to work, with a only
a portion of that gap made up over time. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 746 n.87 (1993) (discussing a study by Laurence Levin and
Joyce Jacobsen and citing Laura Myers, Women Who Interrupt Career Fall Into Pay Gap, BOULDER
DAILY CAMERA, Jan. 11, 1992, at 1A, 11A).
34. Williams, supra note 30.
35. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05 cmt. c.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Coltrane, supra note 31 (reviewing more than 200 scholarly articles and books on household labor published between 1989 and 1999).
40. Id. at 1212.
41. The household version of the economic theory of human capital investment posits that men
and women allocate time to household or paid work based on maximizing utility or efficiency. Id. at
1213. See generally GARY A. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981). This theory thus suggests a
direct link between the wife’s household tasks and the husband’s workplace performance.
42. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 7, § 4.18 cmt. a (offering justification for recharacterization of separate property).
43. Id. §§ 5.05(2), (3), 5.06(2), 5.06(4), 5.07(1), 5.12(2).
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generate specific rules more favorable to dependent spouses. Moreover, a justification based on contribution might lead to distribution rules quite different
from the patterns found in existing case law that the Maintenance Principles
44
claim to reflect.
The Maintenance Principles offer specific formulas for determining the en45
46
47
titlement to and the amount and duration of spousal maintenance. These
formulas limit judicial discretion, the exercise of which has historically provided
48
wives with inadequate maintenance awards. While limitations on judicial discretion may promise to enhance the availability, amount, and duration of
spousal maintenance, the specific formulas offered in the Maintenance Principles prove problematic.
The Maintenance Principles authorize compensatory payments based on
the parties’ disparate financial capacity when 1) one spouse cannot maintain the
49
marital living standard without assistance from the other; or 2) one spouse has
50
provided certain types of caretaking. Awards based on the inability of one
spouse to maintain the marital living standard, however, require marriages of a
51
52
specified duration and a financial disparity of a specified amount. The Maintenance Principles delegate to the states the task of specifying the marital duration and the financial disparity that would support this type of compensatory
53
payment. In today’s political climate, one can predict that male-dominated
state legislatures will adopt rules that make compensatory payments available,
if at all, only in lengthy marriages and only when a very wide gap exists in the
54
parties’ respective financial capacities. This tendency throughout the Principles
to punt difficult policy decisions to state legislatures severely compromises their
ability to improve the post-divorce financial circumstances of women and their
55
dependent children.
44. A maintenance law that recognized the wife’s contribution to her husband’s earning capacity might justify more generous levels of support. The wife’s potential entitlement to maintenance
also might begin at the date of the marriage, rather than only when the marriage endures for a specified duration.
45. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, §§ 5.05(2), 5.06(2), 5.15(1).
46. Id. §§ 5.05(3), 5.06(2), 5.06(4), 5.07(1), 5.12(2), 5.15(4).
47. Id. § 5.07.
48. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1201-15.
49. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05.
50. Id. §§ 5.06, 5.12. The ALI Principles, in Chapter 5, also provide limited reimbursement for
one spouse’s financial contributions to the other spouse’s education or training, irrespective of a disparity in the spouses’ financial capacity, provided the recipient spouse has no entitlement to other
types of compensatory payments. Id. § 5.15.
51. Id. §§ 5.05(1), 5.05(2).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 5.05(2).
54. State legislatures seem particularly resistant to spousal maintenance reforms that favor
women. See Harris, supra note 1, at 737. The Principles do suggest that state rules should provide
compensatory payments in marriage of five or more years when one spouse’s income exceeds the
claimant’s income by twenty-five percent or more. They also offer suggestions on how to compute
the value of compensation payments under Section 5.05. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05.
However, the Principles do not obligate states to adopt any of their suggestions.
55. Perhaps the drafters of Chapter 5 of the ALI Principles deferred to state legislatures on critical issues in order to make their proposals politically palatable and encourage adoption. In the long
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Equitable principles supply the rationale for compensatory payments based
on loss of marital living standard and disparity of financial circumstances. The
Maintenance Principles speak of differential risk, economic exploitation, and expectation. The Maintenance Principles, however, arbitrarily limit equitable justifications to long-term marriages. They explain that wives, especially long-term
homemakers, generally face greater financial risks at the dissolution of marriage
56
than do their husbands. Social patterns suggest that the longer the marriage,
57
the greater the wife’s economic dependence upon her husband. As time passes
the gap widens between the marital living standard and the wife’s earning capacity, and the wife’s earning capacity becomes more difficult, or impossible, to
58
recapture. Although remarriage might help her reestablish her prior marital
standard of living, marriage patterns of men make remarriage unlikely for older
59
women. The husband, in contrast, typically does not face the same risk of financial decline at divorce, and his remarriage prospects exceed those of his
60
wife. Equity, particularly in long-term marriages, suggests that the spouses
61
should share the risk of financial decline at divorce. Compensatory payments
that minimize the decline in the wives’ standard of living also deter the economic exploitation of wives by husbands. Over time the possibility of compensatory payments equalizes the financial stake each spouse has in the success of
62
the marriage, presumably deterring husbands from abandoning older spouses.
Finally, the longer the marriage the more the wife and husband adjust to the
63
marital living standard and legitimately expect it to continue. The Maintenance Principles conclude then that the marital, rather than the premarital, standard of living gradually becomes the proper benchmark by which to measure
64
the appropriate post-divorce financial circumstances of the spouses.
The above equitable justifications are sensible and sensitive to the financial
65
dependency patterns found in the vast majority of marriages. Limiting this
type of compensatory payment to marriages of a specified duration, however, is
troubling. I fail to understand why these justifications and others do not support these awards in all marriages, no matter their duration. Certainly a wife in
a two year marriage might suffer a differential risk at divorce, having more to

run, however, this deference may cause more harm than good to women. Left to their own devices,
I suspect that most state legislatures will develop rules of statewide application that substantially
compromise the Principles’ intent to make spousal maintenance more available and adequate.
Moreover the state legislatures will receive political approval for having passed laws that purport to
address the social problems inherent in divorced women’s financial plight. On the other hand, if the
Maintenance Principles offered their own rules that favored women, state legislatures might well
reject them. Yet outright rejection undoubtedly would provoke criticism and expose the gender biased motives of state legislatures, perhaps promoting political unrest and meaningful reform.
56. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05 cmt. c.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.05 cmt. c.
63. Id. § 5.05 cmt. a.
64. Id. § 5.05 cmt. c.
65. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1172-73 & nn.78-82.
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lose at dissolution than her higher earning husband. The marital, housekeeping,
and caretaking responsibilities she provides typically compromise her
66
workforce participation, increasing her differential risk at divorce. She may refuse overtime, travel with him more frequently, and prepare his meals and his
laundry. She even may leave the workforce entirely. The wife in a short-term
marriage also can develop an expectation interest in the marital living standard
and alter her behavior in reliance upon that expectation. If she leaves the
workforce entirely, for whatever length of time, her earning capacity declines
67
permanently, making her equitable claim stronger. Finally, if a husband knows
that the law provides compensatory payments to his wife once their marriage
reaches a specified duration, he may behave opportunistically and leave his wife
just before her entitlement matures. Thus, the opportunity for exploitation continues under the Maintenance Principles. The availability of compensatory
payments for loss of the marital living standard in all marriages would better
eliminate opportunistic behavior and promote marital stability. Consequently,
given available justifications, a wife in a short-term marriage seems as worthy as
a wife in a long-term marriage to receive compensatory payments based on a
68
loss in her standard of living.
The Maintenance Principles attempt to address the above situation by providing for the restoration of the premarital living standard after a short mar69
This provision, however, only partially restores the premarital living
riage.
70
71
standard and only under very limited circumstances. The spouse seeking
such an award must prove that her inability to recover her premarital living
standard at dissolution results from significant expenditures she made during
marriage, or in anticipation of marriage, from separate property or from her re72
linquishment of specific educational or occupational opportunities. If our hypothetical wife did not leave the workforce, but simply pursued her occupational development with less zeal, this provision would provide her no relief. If
she left the workforce entirely, the second requirement causes her trouble. The
wife must establish that she made the expenditures from her separate property
or relinquished opportunities in order to facilitate the husband’s pursuit of
similar opportunities without undue disruption of marital life, to facilitate the
birth or adoption of children, or to serve a purpose that the spouses agreed con73
tributed to their marital life. Here our hypothetical wife must prove that her
leaving the workforce enabled her husband to pursue occupational opportunities, or facilitated an important goal to which both spouses agreed. Both of these

66. Id. at 1172.
67. See Williams, supra note 30.
68. She seems even more worthy of such an award if the court considers her “contributions” to
her husband’s market labors as an ideal worker, rather than just her lost earning capacity and differential risk.
69. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.16.
70. Id. § 5.16(3).
71. Id. § 5.16(2).
72. Id. § 5.16(2)(a).
73. Id. § 5.16(2)(b).
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provisions invite a potentially expensive and protracted factual fight, a fight she
74
likely lacks the resources to pursue to the finish.
Finally the wife must also establish that she cannot recover the expended
assets or that her lost opportunities leave her with a significantly lower earning
75
capacity than before marriage. Thus our hypothetical wife can recover only if
she has withstood the first two requirements and her lost opportunities have resulted in an earning capacity significantly lower than before marriage. The
Maintenance Principles do not define significantly lower earning capacity, presumably leaving that determination to the discretion of judges who historically
76
discriminate against women, particularly on financial issues in divorce. This
parsimonious provision provides little assistance to wives in short-term marriages, and it does nothing to protect the wife’s expectation interest in the marital living standard.
In addition to compensatory payments based on loss of the marital living
standard and financial disparity, the Maintenance Principles provide supple77
mental compensatory payments when one spouse has performed a dispropor78
tionate share of the care of the marital children or the children of either spouse.
Section 5.06 recognizes what many state judges and laws ignore: primary caretakers often limit their workforce participation, resulting in a loss in earning ca79
pacity. Section 5.06 seeks to compensate the primary caretaker for his or her
loss in earning capacity due to his or her child caretaking responsibilities. While
I find the goal laudable, the devil again lies in the details.
Section 5.06 (2) creates a presumption of entitlement when: 1) the marriage
has produced children, or when either spouse has children; 2) these minor children have lived with the claimant for a minimum period specified in a rule of
statewide application; and 3) the claimant has a substantially lower earning ca80
pacity than the other spouse. The Principles do not define substantially lower
earning capacity, presumably leaving that to judicial discretion. Allowing
81
judges with a history of discrimination against women in dissolution cases to
decide whether the husband’s earning capacity substantially exceeds his wife’s
promises to defeat the availability of such an award as well as the very predictability the presumption seeks to establish. Moreover, the other spouse can defeat the presumption by establishing that the claimant did not provide substantially more than half of the total care that both spouses together provided for the

74.
75.
76.
77.

Freedom, supra note 1, at 1172-78.
ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.16(2)(c).
Freedom, supra note 1, at 1201-15, 1215-16.
A spouse can make a claim for compensatory payments under Sections 5.06 and 5.05. ALI
PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06(5). In no case, however, can the combined value of the child
care durational factor, and the durational factor employed to determine the presumed award under
Section 5.05, exceed the maximum value allowed for the Section 5.05 durational factor alone. Id.
78. Id. § 5.06(1).
79. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1211 & nn.258-62.
80. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06 (2).
81. Judges seem particularly inept at accurately determining the wife’s financial vulnerability at
divorce. See also Harris, supra note 1, at 740 (noting the reluctance of lower courts in Oregon to recognize the value of homemaker contributions to the family economy).
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82

children. This opportunity to rebut the presumption undoubtedly will pre83
cipitate factual disputes, particularly in dual-earner households, and legal and
discovery expenses the claimant (usually the wife) cannot afford. Judges presumably will resolve these disputes, and judges tend to favor the childcare con84
tributions that fathers make more than those made by mothers. The mother’s
limited financial resources and biased judicial discretion suggest that many
mothers will have difficulty triggering the presumption and that the presumption will dissolve in all but the most dramatic cases. Certainly providing primary caretakers compensation for lost earning capacity has merit, but the actual
provisions in the Principles likely will not provide this relief to many mothers.
Assuming that a primary caretaker can trigger the presumption and withstand an attempt to rebut the presumption, a specific formula determines the
85
amount of compensatory payments. The formula applies a specified percentage (the child care durational factor) to the difference in the expected incomes of
86
the spouses after divorce. The Maintenance Principles require the specified
87
percentage to increase as the childcare period increases. The “child care period” is the “period during which the claimant provided significantly more than
88
half of the total care that both spouses together provided for the children.” However, divorce terminates the child care period providing no recognition for the
differential loss in earning capacity the primary residential custodian will expe89
rience after the divorce due to her greater caretaking responsibilities. Moreover, the Maintenance Principles do not offer a formula but again defer to the
90
states, creating the same practical and political problems mentioned above.
Finally, Section 5.07 governs the duration of awards based both on loss of
living standard and on caretaking responsibilities. Section 5.07(1)(a) provides
for awards of unlimited duration when the age of the claimant and the length of
91
the marriage both exceed specified minimum values. The Principles again defer
92
to the states to develop these minimum values. For compensatory awards
based on standard of living loss, Section 5.07(1)(b) provides for indefinite

82. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06(3).
83. The Principles do not define what constitutes child care. If the father watches television with
the child while the mother does the family laundry, which parent provides child care? If dad helps
with the math homework while mom cooks the family dinner, which parent provides child care? If
the father watches the child while the mother does the grocery shopping, which parent provides
child care? Or do both parents provide child care in the above examples. Do the mother’s household tasks, like housecleaning, that indirectly benefit the child constitute child care? Should a court
attach more merit to particular parental behaviors? If so, which ones? The definition of caretaking
function found in the Child Principles does not cure the problem of indefiniteness. See ALI
PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 8, at § 2.03(6).
84. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1195-97 & nn.197-208.
85. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06(4).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 5.06(4)(a).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. The child care period equals the entire period during which the relevant minor children
lived in the same household as the claimant. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06(4)(b).
90. Id. § 5.06(4).
91. Id. § 5.07(1)(a).
92. Id.
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awards and limits their duration to the length of the marriage multiplied by a
93
specified factor. The Principles defer to the states to designate the specific fac94
tor. For compensatory awards based on caregiving, Section 5.07(1)(b) provides
for indefinite awards and limits their duration to the length of the child care pe95
riod multiplied by a specified factor. The Maintenance Principles do not explain why the payments should not continue for the entire duration of the child
care period. Further, the Maintenance Principles fail to explain why compensatory awards based on the primary caretaker’s loss of earning capacity should
terminate at all. If one parent has compromised workforce participation in order to provide childcare, she likely never will recover her reduction in earning
96
capacity. Finally, the Maintenance Principles defer to the states to designate
97
the specific factor, creating the obvious problem of deferring to maledominated legislatures to develop critical rules.
In sum, the Maintenance Principles heroically attempt to create uniform
and predictable law. Yet they build in judicial discretion at critical junctures
that compromises this attempt. Substantively they suffer from a conservative
linkage to existing patterns of judicial behavior, deference to state legislatures on
critical issues, and refusal (without convincing justification) to extend compensatory payments to short as well as long-term marriages. The Property Principles offer even less potential to improve the post-divorce financial circumstances
of women.
III. PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
The Property Principles adopt a presumption in favor of an equal distribu98
tion of marital property. While this presumption limits judicial discretion,
many equitable distribution states already employ a presumption in favor of an
99
equal distribution of marital assets. Many judges, however, continue to exer100
cise their discretion and award wives less than half of the marital property. In
contrast to this judicial pattern, under the Property Principles only the economic
101
fault of a spouse justifies an unequal division. Consequently, judicial application of the Property Principles likely will result in an equal division of marital
property far more frequently than judicial application of current law. While
equal division might enhance the financial circumstances of some divorcing

93. Id. § 5.07(1)(b).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Williams, supra note 30.
97. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.07(1)(b).
98. Id. § 4.15(1).
99. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 452-58 (1996); Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827 (1988).
100. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1216 & n.286.
101. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, §§ 4.15(2)(b), 4.16; see also Oldham, supra note 12, at
804.
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women, many divorcing couples have little property that the law recognizes as
102
marital. Here the conservative nature of the Property Principles emerges.
The Property Principles passively accept conventional definitions and con103
ceptualizations of marital property. Constrained by existing judicial patterns
and the statutory law of the majority of states, the Property Principles exclude
from the concept of marital property, inter alia, occupational licenses and profes104
sional degrees, the enhanced earning capacity of spouses acquired during the
105
106
marriage, and the increase in value of and income from separate property.
The Property Principles offer weak justifications for these exclusions. They
107
They also argue that enexplain that most states have rejected such claims.
hanced earning capacity also should not constitute marital property, because an
inequitable result may occur. Divorce law does not consider property acquired
before the marriage as marital, thus a spouse’s earning capacity prior to marriage remains separate property. The other spouse, however, might begin
working during marriage, making all of that spouse’s income marital. While the
above scenario might well produce an inequitable result, nothing prevents the
law from taking the above possibility into account in the actual distribution of
the marital assets. Moreover, it is difficult to accept that a spouse’s earning capacity prior to the marriage must remain separate property simply because existing law labels it separate.
The Property Principles also argue that marital property should not include
earning capacity because under existing law courts cannot modify property
108
awards. An inequitable result may occur if the court makes a property award
based on a spouse’s earning capacity at divorce, that spouse’s income declines
102. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1216-17 nn.291-92. A law that requires equal distribution also
eliminates the potential to award more of the marital property to the more economically distressed
spouse, usually the wife.
103. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, § 4.03 cmt. a; Oldham, supra note 12, at 803 (recognizing that the ALI provisions regarding property distribution comprise a restatement rather than
a serious reform effort).
104. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.07(2).
105. Id. § 4.07(1).
106. The increase in value of and income from separate property during the marriage are marital
only to the extent they are recharacterized, id. §§ 4.04(1), 4.18(3), or are attributable to either spouse’s
marital labor, id. §§ 4.04(2), 4.05(2).
107. Id. § 4.04 cmt. a. Oregon provides an instructive example. In 1993 the Oregon legislature
amended Oregon’s property distribution statute to require courts to consider enhanced earning capacity as marital property. The legislature, however, did not extend Oregon’s presumption of an
equal contribution to the acquisition of marital property to the acquisition of enhanced earning capacity. Moreover a spouse claiming an interest in the other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity had
to establish that she made a material contribution to the enhancement. The claimant spouse could
satisfy the requirement of material contribution by showing that, among other things, she contributed financially or otherwise to the education and training that resulted in the other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity. The contribution had to be substantial and for a prolonged duration. In
1995 the Oregon legislature amended the statute to “allow” rather than require courts to consider
enhanced earning capacity as marital property. In 1999 the legislature repealed entirely the portion
of the Oregon property distribution statute pertaining to enhanced earning capacity. Oregon now
considers enhanced earning capacity relevant only to an award of spousal maintenance. Leslie Joan
Harris, A “Just and Proper Divison”: Property Distribution at Divorce in Oregon, 78 OR. L. REV. 735, 737
n.9 (1999).
108. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.07 cmt. a.
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subsequent to divorce, and the court cannot modify the award to reflect the
change in circumstance. I again agree that this situation might well produce an
inequitable result, but cannot accept that a court cannot modify a property
award based on earning capacity simply because existing law does not provide
that opportunity.
The Principles also refuse to define the increase in value of separate prop109
erty as marital property, noting that most jurisdictions reject this approach.
110
Certainly some jurisdictions do label such increases as marital.
Ignoring the
111
justifications of these states simply because the majority rejects them seems
particularly weak. Just as with spousal maintenance, this conservative approach
of wrapping reforms around existing law compromises the Property Principles’
ability to alter the financial circumstances of divorced women.
The Property Principles do offer one substantial change in existing law.
Section 4.18 gradually recharacterizes separate property as marital property in
112
This recharacterization somewhat ameliorates the oplong-term marriages.
portunities lost by the Principles’ refusal to label as marital any currently recognized type of separate property. The specifics, however, limit recharacterization’s usefulness.
First, as noted above, the Property Principles specifically exclude spousal
earning capacity, spousal skills, post-dissolution spousal labor, occupational li113
Thus, recharcenses, and educational degrees from the concept of property.
acterization does not affect these potential forms of property.
Second, recharacterization becomes available only in marriages that exceed
114
The Property Principles characteristically defer to the
a specified duration.
115
Just as
states to develop a marriage duration rule of statewide application.
with compensatory payments, one can predict that male-dominated legislatures
will adopt a rule, if they allow recharacterization at all, that requires marriages
of significant duration before recharacterization begins.
Third, the Property Principles arbitrarily restrict recharacterization to longterm marriages. They explain that in lengthy marriages, parties likely expect
that separate assets will provide for joint retirement, a medical crisis of either
116
As the marriage duration increases,
spouse, or other personal emergencies.

109. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, at 108-09.
110. Id (noting that Rhode Island, Colorado and Pennsylvania classify as marital all increases in
the value of separate property that occur during the marriage).
111. Due to the devastating social impact of the impoverishment of divorced women and dependent children, states might want to make additional financial resources available at divorce. A
state also may recognize that married couples develop financial plans based on their combined assets. A wife, for instance, may not maximize her contributions to her retirement account, counting
on the increased value of the husband’s larger retirement account to provide for their joint financial
future. One spouse may sell a valuable asset, because the couple needs cash and the other spouse’s
separate assets are increasing in value more rapidly. The spouse that sells expects the increased
value of the other spouse’s assets to offset his or her personal financial sacrifice.
112. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.18.
113. Id. § 4.07 cmt. a.
114. Id. § 4.18(1).
115. Id. § 4.18(1)(a).
116. Id. § 4.18 cmt. a.

BRYAN - FMT.DOC

09/06/01 2:52 PM

FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF WOMEN

179

117

this expectation also increases. The Property Principles further explain that in
lengthy marriages, spouses will likely have made employment decisions or
marital investment decisions that relied upon the availability of separate as118
sets. Spousal expectations and reliance then justify recharacterization. However, spouses in short-term marriages may well share the same expectations as
spouses in long-term marriages. A spouse in a short-term marriage also may
make employment and investment decisions based on the availability of the
other spouse’s separate wealth. The Property Principles ignore these possibili119
ties, constraining their potential to alleviate the post-divorce financial deprivation of many wives. Limiting recharacterization to marriages of a specified
duration also invites opportunistic behavior by encouraging a spouse with valuable separate property to leave the marriage just before recharacterization begins. If recharacterization began at marriage, this encouragement would disappear.
Fourth, once a marriage has reached a specified duration only a percentage
120
of separate property becomes marital. The percentage increases as the length
of the marriage increases until at some point all separate property becomes
121
marital. The Principles again charge states with the task of developing a per122
centage rule of statewide application. One can only imagine the resistance of
state legislatures to such a percentage rule, suggesting that the recharacterization process ultimately will proceed very slowly, if at all.
Fifth, even in marriages of significant duration, separate property received
during the marriage does not become marital property until the spouse has “held”
123
the separate property for a specified duration. If a husband in a twenty-year
marriage inherits several million dollars from his parents, no percentage of that
separate property becomes marital until the husband holds that property for a
specified time period. Once again, the Principles charge states with the task of
124
developing a “holding” rule, precipitating the same practical and political
problems noted above. Even more problematic, a spouse can entirely avoid the
recharacterization of gifts or inheritances received during the marriage simply
by giving written notice of such an intent to the other spouse within a specified
125
time period after the property’s receipt. Spouses can plan for twenty years on
the inheritance of one spouse to fund their mutual retirements, yet the spouse
who inherits can violate those expectations simply by declaring his or her intent
to do so.

117. Id.
118. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.18 cmt. a.
119. Under very limited circumstances, the Principles do provide some relief for spouses in shortterm marriages. See discussion of compensatory payments at supra note 77.
120. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 4.18(1)(a).
121. Id. § 4.18(1)(b).
122. Id. § 4.18(1).
123. Id. § 4.18(2).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 4.18(4). The Court also retains the discretion to refuse to recharacterize property if the
Court explicitly finds that it must preserve the property’s separate character to avoid a substantial
injustice. Id. § 4.18(6).
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The Property Principles’ widespread deference to states on critical recharacterization rules and a spouse’s ability to avoid entirely the recharacterization
of gifts and inheritances received during the marriage, significantly diminish the
ability of recharacterization to enhance the property available for distribution at
divorce. As a result, recharacterization does not change property distribution
law enough to substantially improve the post-divorce financial situation of most
dependent wives and children.
IV. ALLOCATIONS OF CUSTODIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHILDREN
As mentioned above, divorcing mothers frequently trade away their financial interests in order to secure custody of their children. An approach to child
custody that honored the commitment of the primary caretaking parent might
discourage this practice and improve the post-divorce financial circumstances of
dependent mothers and their children. The Child Principles offer a presumption
that instructs judges to allocate custodial responsibilities in proportion to the
126
caretaking functions each parent previously performed for the child. At first
blush this presumption seems to honor the caretaking parent, providing some
assurance to the mother of an allocation of custodial responsibility commensu127
rate with her prior commitment. The broad definition of caretaking functions,
however, will undoubtedly precipitate factual quarrels, especially in dual-earner
households where sources outside the nuclear family provide much of the caretaking.
128
If the father explains a televised football game to his daughter while the
129
mother cooks the family dinner, which parent has provided the caretaking? If
130
a mother helps with math homework while the father launders the family
131
clothing, which parent has provided the caretaking? Are certain types of
caretaking more important, and therefore more deserving than others? Very
importantly, the Maintenance Principles provide a strong incentive for fathers to
dispute mothers’ claims of greater caretaking. If, on the issue of cutsody, a father concedes that a mother has performed substantially more of the child care
than he has, he exposes himself to compensatory payments based on caretak132
ing. Consequently, the Maintenance Principles encourage disputes regarding
the caretaking functions of each parent.

126. See ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 2.09(1). The Principles also attempt to allocate decisionmaking responsibilities based upon the parents’ respective past participation in child-related
decisionmaking. Id. § 2.10(1)(b). Other factors, however, also influence allocation of decisionmaking
responsibilities. Id. § 2.10(a), (c), (d), (e), (f).
127. Id. § 2.03(6).
128. The father could argue that he performed the caretaking functions of “development and
maintenance of appropriate interpersonal relationships with . . . adults,” id. § 2.03(6)(e), or of “recreation and play,” Id. § 2.03(6)(a).
129. The mother could argue that she fulfilled the caretaking function of feeding the child. Id. §
2.03(6)(a).
130. Supervision of homework is a caretaking function. Id. § 2.03(6)(d).
131. Id. § 2.03(6)(a) (recognizing caretaking functions that meet the daily physical needs of the
child).
132. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, § 5.06.
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Resolving a factual dispute in favor of a mother requires the expenditure of
133
financial resources the dependent mother frequently does not possess. Additionally, courts frequently value the caretaking that fathers provide more than
134
that of mothers, suggesting that gender bias will influence the actual applica135
tion of this standard.
If the court cannot determine how parents divided caretaking responsibilities during the marriage, then the court must employ the best interest standard
136
in allocating these responsibilities. Court application of the best interests stan137
Moreover in making
dard frequently fails to honor the caretaking mother.
custody decisions the Principles allow courts to rely upon the same incompetent
138
guardians ad litem and others who historically have failed to protect mothers’
139
interests in their children. The above suggests that caretaking mothers likely
will not trust the presumption or the default best interests standard to protect
their interests in custody. They likely will continue to trade financial resources
for custody.
V. SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
Laws that honor divorce separation agreements make sense only if most
separation agreements will provide adequate financial resources for women and
140
their dependent children. In order for a wife to obtain adequate financial resources during negotiations with her husband, the substantive law must support her claims. As argued, application of the substantive law that the ALI proposes likely will not provide the wife with adequate financial resources at
divorce. Even if we assume that state legislatures have developed entitlement
criteria that adequately protect women, however, enforcement of separation
agreements remains highly problematic.
For the most part, the maintenance and property formulas and presumptions offered by the ALI will improve the ability of divorcing spouses and their
lawyers to predict what a court would award at trial. The predictability of trial
results arguably increases the likelihood that divorce settlement agreements will
141
reflect existing law. Presumably, if both spouses know that a court likely will
133. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1172-80 nn.78-113, 1200 nn.219-20, 1220 nn.300-03.
134. Id. at 1195-98 nn.196-209, 1225-34 nn.334-77.
135. The Principles strongly encourage parents to bypass the court and develop their own parenting plans for their children, either on their own or in mediation. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note
9. Negotiations, however, will occur in the shadow of the substantive custody law that provides
mothers little protection of their custody interests. Moreover, shuffling these disputes into the private realm of mediation and negotiation creates a context in which parents easily can make custody
and financial trade-offs with little fear of detection or correction by the court. See generally ALI
PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, §§ 2.06, 2.08; ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 2.07.
136. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 2.09(3).
137. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1192-201 nn.185-224.
138. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 8, § 2.15.
139. Freedom, supra note 1, 1198-200.
140. Id. at 1153-70.
141. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 6, at 11; Freedom, supra note 1, at 1234 nn.379 & 380. See
also Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV.
441, 522 & n.320 (1992); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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award the wife five hundred dollars per month in compensatory payments for
five years, the husband likely will agree to settle for comparable compensatory
payments. Many factors other than law, however, influence the terms of settlement agreements.
142
Most wives depend financially upon their husbands. Their economic dependency creates innumerable problems in divorce negotiations. Typically hus143
144
bands resist paying, and judges resist ordering, temporary support for wives
during the pendency of the divorce proceeding. When a wife can no longer
meet her and the children’s basic needs, she typically has difficulty “holding
145
Many
out” for a settlement agreement that reflects her legal entitlements.
146
wives cannot afford competent legal representation, nor can they engage in the
147
A mother with inadeexpensive discovery necessary to develop their cases.
148
quate financial resources risks losing custody of her children, a factor that
149
prompts women to trade away financial interests to secure custody. Psychological factors and socialized tendencies also inhibit the ability of many women
150
to negotiate effectively with their husbands during divorce. Moreover many
lawyers exhibit gender bias and encourage women to accept poor settlements in
151
divorce. The formulas the Principles offer for property distribution and spousal
maintenance do nothing to alter these practical circumstances that promote unfair settlements.
152
The Principles recognize and attempt to address the danger of unfair settlements in several ways. The Principles require an enforceable agreement to
153
comply with general principles of contract law and Chapter 7 of the Principles.
The contract law that states apply to separation agreements recognizes the unconscionability, and resulting unenforceability, of grossly unfair agreements
154
entered into under duress, coercion, or fraud. Application of the unconscionability doctrine historically has provided little relief to women who have entered

142. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1172-73 (explaining the source and the extent of wives’ financial
dependency on husbands).
143. Id. at 1174 & n.87 & 88.
144. Id. at 1173 & n.86.
145. Id. at 1173-74.
146. Id. at 1174-76.
147. Id. at 1174-77.
148. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1178-80.
149. Id.
150. Naive trust, care orientation, low status, depression, low expectations, and ineffective conflict resolution styles disadvantage women more than men during divorce negotiations. Id. at 11801191. See also Bryan, supra note 141, at 449-90 (exploring the tangible and intangible power disparities between husbands and wives that disadvantage wives in divorce negotiations and mediation).
151. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1234-38 & nn.378-403 (exploring how and why lawyers frequently provide divorcing wives with inadequate representation).
152. The Principles recognize that policy concerns (presumably the impoverishment of women
and children are among them) justify some constraints on the parties’ freedom to contact at divorce.
ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 7.02.
153. Id. § 7.15.
154. Freedom, supra note 1, at 1240-42.
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155

unfair settlement agreements.
Nothing the Principles provide offers to alter
this historical pattern. Consequently, any protection women have against inequitable settlement agreements must come from the Agreement Principles.
156
Section 7.15 addresses the enforceability of separation agreements. It requires courts to enforce separation agreements if, prior to accepting the agreement, “each party had full and fair opportunity to be informed of the value of
the parties’ marital and separate assets, each party’s current earning and pros157
pects for future earnings, and the significance of the terms of the agreement.”
This provision assumes that an “opportunity to be informed” regarding the financial circumstances of each spouse and the meaning of the agreement’s terms
protects a weaker spouse. Two fundamental problems, however, confront this
assumption.
158
Although information clearly provides power in divorce negotiations,
this provision only requires an opportunity to obtain information. If gender bi159
ased and self-interested judges continue to decide the enforceability of separation agreements, we can expect them to find that all women represented by
counsel, no matter how inadequate, had the requisite opportunity to obtain in160
formation. We also can expect these judges to find that a woman had the requisite opportunity, when her husband or his attorney testifies that they encour161
aged her to obtain an attorney and she refused. In sum, the difficulty lies not in
the provision itself, but in its application.
Second, although information does provide some power in divorce negotiations, information alone does not guarantee a fair result. A wife may understand completely the financial circumstances of the marriage, yet, as noted
162
above, lack the requisite power to negotiate effectively with her husband.
Gender biased and self-interested courts also attribute understanding of an
163
agreement to wives under egregious circumstances.
The Principles offer one more protection against unfair settlement agreements. Section 7.15(2) instructs courts to refuse to enforce settlement agreements that differ substantially from the law that governs compensatory payments
or property disposition and that substantially impair the economic well-being of a
party who has primary or dual residential responsibility for children or has sub-

155. Id. at 1239-70 nn.419, 423-25 & 427-647 (reviewing cases in which judges applied the unconscionability doctrine to separation agreements).
156. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8, § 7.15.
157. Id. § 7.15(1)(c). The Principles also require that separation agreement satisfy the requirements of enforceable contract, id. § 7.15(a), that it be in writing and signed by the parties, or stipulated by the parties before the court, id. § 7.15(b), and that it satisfy other requirements of state law
specially applicable to separation agreements, id. § 7.15 (1)(d).
158. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1177 & n.103; Bryan, supra note 141, at 447 n.13.
159. Judicial frustration with overcrowded dockets, judicial deference to family privacy, and judicial distaste for divorce cases, and a pervasive preference for private settlement encourage judges
to accept without serious question unfair divorce settlements. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1238-39
n.405-08, 1243 n.428.
160. Id. at 1255 & n.520, 1177 n.103, 1265-69 & n.603, 1267 & n.618.
161. Id. at 1256-57.
162. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
163. See Freedom, supra note 2, at 1258-62 & nn.551 & 573.
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164

stantially fewer economic resources than the other party. This provision mimics the unconscionability doctrine, but differs in one important respect. Generally unconscionability requires procedural irregularity, i.e., duress, fraud, coer165
Section 7.15(2) eliminates procedural
cion, as well as substantive unfairness.
irregularity and allows courts to focus exclusively on the substantive fairness of
the separation agreement, making it easier for courts to invalidate unfair agreements. Historically, however, courts have found extremely lop-sided agree166
The requirements that an agreement substantially
ments substantively fair.
differ from the law and substantially impair the economic well-being of a party
who has substantially fewer economic resources than the other party actually
invite continuation of this pattern. Without meaningful intervention or control
over judicial discretion, this pattern undoubtedly will continue.
States cannot rely upon contract doctrine or the Agreement Principles to
protect women from unfair settlement agreements. Not only do judges have
reprehensible track records in responding to women’s challenges to separation
agreements, most women lack the financial and emotional resources to mount
167
such challenges in the first instance. The important social policies at stake in
divorce cry out for more meaningful intervention in the settlement process.
VI. CONCLUSION
I regret this rather negative critique of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution proposals. Certainly meaningful reform in
this area is long over-due. While I doubt that the ALI proposals will significantly alter the financial circumstances of divorced women and their dependent
children, the proposals remain important. In the area of compensatory payments and property distribution, the ALI moves in the right direction by attempting to limit judicial discretion and to solidify a wife’s entitlements, however meager. More importantly the ALI proposals undoubtedly will give rise to
a lively national debate on family dissolution issues. Hopefully those debates
will generate more radical reform.

164. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 8.
165. See supra note and accompanying text.
166. See Freedom, supra note 1, at 1243-70 & nn.599, 603, 618, & 641 (reviewing cases in which
judges refused to set aside lop-sided settlement agreements).
167. Id. at 1243 & n.429.

